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The enduring relevance of the developmental state paradigm across 
space and time: Lessons for Africa on structural transformation and 
agriculture in oil-rich contexts 
Abstract 
Emerging economies have recently faced commodity price declines that reinforce the 
instability of natural resources as a basis for socio-economic transformation. This has 
re-energised arguments for industrialisation as necessary for such transitions. Drawing 
upon classical development economics theory, this paper offers a deployment of an 
enhanced developmental state paradigm (DSP) that highlights the roles of agriculture 
and mineral resources in the pursuit of industrial progress. This application of the DSP 
has its basis in narratives on Asian developmental states with focus on mineral-
resource endowment. Employed with reference to Africa’s key emerging economy and 
net petroleum exporter, Nigeria, the DSP shows how the state, influenced by significant 
milieus, has enabled linkages between oil and agriculture that can drive industrial 
transformation. The paper finds that linkages between oil and agriculture are well-
established, however economic, social and political influences on the state have 
engendered agriculture’s limited onward contribution to structural change.  
 
Introduction 
Emerging economies have faced major economic challenges in recent times. Key 
amongst these is the impact of commodity price declines on exporters that reinforces 
risks associated with price volatility for socio-economic transformation (World Bank, 
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2015: 21). This state of affairs has re-energised arguments for industrial transformation 
as a steadier base for development and transition. This paper contributes to recent 
debates on structural transformation in resource-rich economies by advancing 
theoretical considerations in the developmental state paradigm. In doing so it highlights 
the dynamics of the state in engaging agriculture and mineral resources in the pursuit 
of industrialisation. The paper focuses on Africa’s key emerging economy, Nigeria. It is 
the archetypal resource-rich and -dependent economy as a major petroleum exporter 
with crude oil dominating merchandise exports at 75 percent as well as oil revenues 
dominating public revenue at almost 70 per cent, in 2014 (IMF, 2014; CBN, 2016). With 
low petroleum prices, the already limited and import-dependent manufacturing sector  
suffered a further 7 per cent decline in 2015/2016 evidenced also by a fall in capital 
imports of 60.9 per cent in 2015/2016 (PWC, 2016; NBS, 2016).  
 
Recognition of the limits of commodities-led growth has energised development policy 
discussions in key global research and policy institutions on industrialisation in Africa 
across spheres including environmental sustainability, regionalism as well as public 
and private sector collaboration (Newman et al, 2016; Noman and Stiglitz, 2015; 
UNECA, 2014; UNECA, 2016; Ayelazuno, 2014; World Bank, 2012).These debates 
revisit the industrialisation drive across Africa in the post-independence and post-
colonial period preceding the structural adjustment era of the 1980s; highlight the 
significance of Asian developmental states’ experiences and; discuss the challenges 
with state-market dichotomous approaches both in the critique of market- and state-led 
approaches.  
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Re-engaging the post-independence period in Africa is essential to the discourse on 
structural transformation given that this period was one of the most industrially robust 
on the continent. From independence until the oil price shocks of the 1970s, GDP 
performances in Africa were higher than the global average, OECD and South Asian 
economies and almost at par with East Asia (Jerven, 2011). Africa’s share of global 
manufacturing value added has performed poorly in the aftermath of this period; since 
achieving 1.9 per cent in 1980 it has only ever reached 1.5 per cent in 2011, despite 
high growth rates (UNECA, 2014). 
  
The successes of Asia’s developmental states remain of significance to the African 
context because these economies present an empirical reality that is approachable as 
a basis for examining development experiences, both in chronological terms (being 
relatively recent) and in practice (having emulated others). Recalibrating the state-
market logic is an essential element of grappling with the analysis of socio-economic 
transformation, especially within the African context. Yet across the spectrum of 
development thinking, from the orthodoxy to heterodoxy, the state-market dichotomy is 
dominant and detailed analyses of these contexts are replete with empirical 
contradictions.  
 
This paper has two aims. First, to introduce a novel enhancement to the developmental 
state paradigm (DSP) that engages industrialisation as interlinked with agricultural and 
mineral resource sectors as well as privileging the economic, social and political factors 
that influence the state as a development actor. Second, to deploy this as an analytical 
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tool with reference to Nigeria. The paper makes an original contribution as it develops 
and uses the enhanced DSP to consider how the Nigerian state, influenced by 
economic, political and social factors, manages fiscal linkages between oil and 
agriculture that can drive consumption and production linkages between agriculture 
and industry to address classical constraints on industrialisation such as demand and 
food and raw material supply (marketed surplus).  
 
The paper has five parts. Following this introduction, the second section considers the 
DSP and potential for its enhancement with attention to its theoretical foundation in 
classical development economics and its utility across space and issue. The third 
section presents and uses the enhanced DSP to examine the Nigerian state’s efforts 
towards driving intra-primary sector linkages, under the influence of underlying 
economic, social and political factors, as part of structural transformation pursuits 
over the development planning period. The fourth section considers the continuities 
this produces in later policy periods on potential linkages between agriculture and 
structural transformation in Nigeria. The fifth section concludes by highlighting 
lessons for the current impetus towards industrial policy and change in Nigeria and 
beyond.   
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Pursuing structural transformation from primary sector bases: The 
utility of the Developmental State Paradigm  
 
This section considers the analytical value of the DSP with attention to its 
malleability for engaging varied developing contexts across space and issue. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, analyses of the experiences of first-tier developmental 
states: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, put forward the intellectual position that 
the state was essential to socio-economic change steered by industrialisation 
(Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). The conceptualisation of 
developmental statehood based on examination of these empirical experiences 
through classical economic modernisation theories, gave rise to the DSP. It was 
reinforced by debates in second tier developmental states namely: Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand, in extended consideration of case studies with varied 
circumstances, such as resource endowment (See: Collins and Bosworth, 1996; 
Akyuz et al, 1998; Booth, 1999).  
 
 Contemporary attention to industrial policy in this consolidated age of 
neoliberalism has its foundations in the DSP. It drove a resurgence of industrial 
policy in thought and practice as it challenged mainstream thinking on the primacy 
of the market mechanism in the allocation of resources as well as antagonism 
between the state and the market in socio-economic transformation. This was 
especially pertinent after the mixed outcomes of widespread structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP) that focussed on squeezing the public vis-à-vis the private 
 6 
sector but fell short of delivering industrial transformation and economic 
diversification as was intended.  
 
The analytical value of the DSP 
The analytical weight of the DSP as a conceptual framework is its focus on classical 
development economics-based interpretations of empirical realities in East Asia in the 
Post-War period. It has capacity for greater depth and breadth given its methodological 
basis in inductive examination of empirical experiences as a basis for theorising. This 
allows for the (re)introduction of significant issues  including agriculture and mineral 
resource wealth as well as the complex state-market interlinkages that may otherwise 
have been neglected, as long as they have been relevant in the DSP’s own empirical 
underpinning. 
 
The DSP’s theoretical basis is in classical development economics in the situation 
of the state as a critical actor in industrial transformation. Baran (1957) and Myrdal 
(1968) have alluded to the absence of economic transition in the developing world 
as a consequence of states that cannot challenge the historical socio-economic 
disadvantages in the global economy as well as dominant interests that can 
undermine transformation. Classical development economics informs the DSP in 
arguments for a central role for the state in: generation of savings for capital 
investments to support industrial transformation (Lewis, 1954; Gerschenkron, 
1962); design and implementation of industrial policy and creation of relevant 
institutions (Lewis, 1954; Hirschman, 1958) and; organisation and implementation 
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of investment in physical and social infrastructure, education and health 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1946; Nurkse, 1953; Lewis, 1954; Rostow, 1960). 
 
The DSP is presented as comprising the economic and political schools that are 
distinct but interlinked and dependent on one another (Fine, 2007). The former 
focuses on industrial policy and the latter, the nature and construct of the state and 
the forces that compel or allow it to execute economic policies successfully such 
as colonial history, conflict and security experiences, bureaucratic capacity and 
state autonomy. Heterodox economics contributions have contested the 
conceptual rigour of the DSP on account of its basis in the state-market dichotomy 
as is evidenced by the presence of two schools: economic and political (Fine, 2012). 
The result of this is that the extent to which the nature and construct of the state 
influences economic policies as well as outcomes and vice versa receives limited 
scrutiny. This is because economic and political processes are viewed as distinct 
and explicable mainly in either school. 
 
Another factor has undermined the wider applicability of the DSP in its exclusion of 
key sectors outside of industrialisation. Chief of these is the agricultural sector, 
which has been fundamental to the industrial transition of the developmental states. 
Attention has not only been confined to industry but particularly to the ‘catch up’ 
phase in the industrialisation process. As such the interaction between the 
agricultural and industrial sectors and the critical role this plays in development, 
even within the developmental states, are little considered within the framework.  
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It is against this background that the developmental state framework has been 
criticised as being of limited value to the African context, because of its focus on 
outcomes in industrialisation (Mkandawire, 2001). In addition, Neocosmos (2010) 
suggests that developmental states in Africa had their season in the post-
independence period, the continent’s industrial heyday.  
 
Deconstructing the DSP’s empirical roots: The place of agriculture in 
industrialisation  
Historically agriculture has constituted a fundamental component of socio-
economic transformation. As a dominant sector it continues to play a significant 
role in the development processes in the Global South, including this paper’s 
country case, Nigeria. Francks et al (1999) and Karshenas (1995) have shown that 
agriculture was a fundamental aspect of the structural transformation process in 
the first-tier developmental states, especially as a source of intersectoral resource 
transfers of savings, labour and food/ raw material supply, i.e., marketed surplus 
and as a source of industrial demand. In addition, agriculture can profoundly shape 
the construct of the eventual industrial sector. The continued engagement in 
agricultural activities alongside industrial activities in Taiwan influenced the small-
scale structure of the manufacturing sector amongst a myriad of other factors, vis-
à-vis the relatively large-scale structure of the manufacturing sector in South Korea 
that saw labour transfer from the rural agricultural sector (Ho, 1979; Francks et al, 
1999: 114).  
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The neglect of the agricultural sector within the DSP is paradoxical in so far as 
classical development economic theory has emphasised the role of agriculture in 
structural transformation and indeed industrialisation. A seminal contribution by 
Lewis (1954) on industrialisation as development is interpreted as relying on 
agriculture as the starting point of the transition process. Johnston and Mellor (1961) 
proposed early on that agriculture vis-à-vis structural transformation has specific 
roles of: meeting the food demand of the population; contributing to savings and 
foreign exchange; supplying labour and raw materials and; a source of demand for 
the industrial and service sectors.  
 
Analyses of Nigeria evidence the shortcomings of the DSP in its focus on 
industrialisation to the exclusion of key economic sectors including agriculture and 
mineral resources. This is the general premise of the literature that endorses the 
blanket dismissal of the state’s developmental performance due to the 
simultaneous focus on perceived state failures such as corruption and primacy of 
private sector innovation (Ezema and Ogujuiba, 2011; Aiyede, 2009; Brautigam, 
1997). They also reflect the dominance of a state-market dichotomy that presents 
the state and market as being in enmity with one another with limited attention to 
their complex interlinkages that shape development processes and outcomes. 
 
The wider use of the DSP can and must undertake comprehensive understanding 
of industrialisation that encompasses other aspects and phases in development, 
especially agriculture. It must transcend the state-market dichotomy by taking 
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cognisance of the necessary interrelated workings between the state, market and 
other entities and actors. In Ikpe (2013) this is achieved in reflection on how 
developmental states (influenced by key milieus) engaged the agricultural sector to 
manage classical economic constraints on industrialisation:  savings, food/raw 
material supply, i.e., marketed surplus, demand and labour between the late 
nineteenth century and the 1970s.1 
 
Enhancing the DSP: Linkages, agriculture and oil  
This enhanced DSP reintroduces agriculture by paying attention to how mineral 
resource-rich developmental states managed intersectoral resource transfers 
between the primary and secondary sectors through effecting linkages between 
agricultural and mineral resource sectors to drive industrial development. It 
proposes that the state drives structural transformation processes and outcomes 
by managing fiscal, consumption and production (forward) linkages across 
agriculture, oil and manufacturing to address classical constraints on 
                                            
1 Essentially developmental states managed savings constraints by extensively taxing the agricultural 
sector and manipulating foreign exchange rates (and prices) with regard to agricultural exports; alleviated 
marketed surplus constraints by appropriating food from producers at low prices, obliging producers to 
pay for credit in food, making investment in infrastructure and provision of subsidised inputs and 
protecting the domestic agricultural sector from foreign competition; limited industrial demand constraints 
by protection of the domestic industrial sector from foreign competition, pursuing agricultural investments 
to enhance  output and supporting pluriactivity to improve  incomes; and mitigated labour constraints by 
locating industrial activity in rural areas to enable pluriactivity, investing in rural infrastructure and social 
services to enable rural industrial activity and driving investment in land- and labour- saving technology 
to ease the outflow of labour from agriculture.  
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industrialisation: domestic industrial demand and food supply (marketed surplus) 
particularly during initial stages of structural transformation. 
 
 The enhanced DSP has its theoretical basis in Hirschman’s linkages thesis. Key 
theories within the natural resource curse discourse are concerned also with the 
ways in which petroleum resources can impact (negatively) on the wider economy. 
The Dutch Disease theorem exposits the tendency of the mineral resource sector 
to undermine performance in lagging traded sectors through exchange rate 
mechanisms (Corden and Neary, 1982). The Rentier Thesis contests state capacity 
in enabling fiscal linkages across the economy (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). 
However, the linkages thesis offers deeper analytical value as it provides a premise 
for analysing the role of the state in mitigating potential challenges that can attend 
resource abundance.  
 
 Hirschman (1981) offers particular insights on the impact of mineral resource 
endowment on socio-economic transformation. He argues that the so-called natural 
resource curse is the result of weak and unproductive linkages between the mineral 
resource sector and the rest of the economy. In particular, priority for fiscal linkages 
is viewed as a necessity given the limited means of resource transfer out of the 
mineral-resource sector (Hirschman, 1981: 67). This argument is furthered with the 
suggestion that fiscal linkages have and can be used to ‘irrigate’ other sectors of 
the economy if invested wisely (Hirschman, 1981: 69, 71). Based on this reading, 
fiscal transfer into agriculture can lead to improved capital investments, input 
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availability, extension services and credit access. This can strengthen agricultural 
performance thus driving forward production linkages in food and raw material 
production. This outcome can address local food and industrial raw material 
demand to buoy industrialisation. As these agricultural improvements raise the 
material wellbeing of agricultural producers, through increased productivity, they 
are then able to increase consumption of locally manufactured goods thus 
supporting the domestic industrial sector.  
 
Based on the linkages thesis, analysis of second-tier mineral rich developmental 
state, Indonesia, provides empirical grounding for the enhanced DSP. Fiscal 
transfers from oil to agriculture were influenced by the state and enabled public 
provision of subsidised inputs and access to credit to producers alongside rural 
infrastructural developments (Mears and Moeljon, 1981; Booth, 1989; Daryanto, 
1999). Production linkages addressed food supply constraints on industrialisation 
based on the reality of improved performance in food production, notably staple 
food, rice, as evidenced by the achievement self-sufficiency in 1984 (Panuju et al, 
2013).2 Structural transformation was strengthened also by the agricultural sector 
through consumption linkages. Agriculture motivated the industrial sector through 
consumption of locally produced goods and labour-intensive goods and services 
(Daryanto, 1999; Uphoff, 1999; Bautista et al, 1999). 
 
                                            
2 It is important to note that this upward trend has been petering out since the 1990s.  
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The enhanced DSP allows for the examination of interlinked economic, political and 
social factors within the noted processes. The linkages lens engages complex 
interactions across spheres and enables the ‘reintroduction of class [social], 
economic and political interests… in order to examine how these are represented 
through both the market and through the state’ (Fine, 2007:3). From the 
developmental states, these interests were found to have influenced the pattern of 
interventions in the agricultural sector, including the targeting of the dominant 
small-scale agricultural production systems (See Francks et al, 1999; Karshenas, 
1995). In Indonesia this was echoed by a focus on the broadest base of smallholder 
agricultural producers as a result of the political influence of the rural landowning 
elite, the dominance of elite military officials from agriculture-based communities 
and the coincidence of military rule as well as President Soeharto’s commitment to 
his modest rural background (Frederick and Worde, 1993; Estrade, 1998; McGuire, 
2010: 273). 
 
In sum, the DSP has its intellectual foundations both in classical development 
economic theory and empiricism, thus drawing intrinsically upon actual experiences 
of success and indeed failures of state action, with reference to both the domestic 
and international political economy contexts, towards socio-economic 
transformation. The tendency has been to prioritise particular elements such as 
latecomer industrialisation and successful state action. Nonetheless, this empirical 
basis allows a degree of malleability, as has been shown, towards engaging 
significant notions that have been traditionally excluded from this framework such 
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as the primary sector (agriculture and mineral resources) and the complex 
interactions between the state and other critical entities in development processes. 
 
Managing linkages between oil and agriculture to address classical 
constraints on industrialisation:  Deploying the enhanced DSP in 
Nigeria  
This section presents and deploys the enhanced DSP to examine the interaction 
between the petroleum and agricultural sectors towards structural transformation 
across the post-independence period in Nigeria, as this was one of dedicated 
industrial policy through development planning. This allows reflection on the 
potential for consumption and production linkages to mitigate food/raw material 
supply, i.e., marketed surplus, and industrial demand constraints. It then analyses 
the underlying factors that have underpinned state action. 
 
Mkandawire (2001:295) has argued that in the post-independence period, states in 
Africa acted in a developmentalist manner as their leadership centred on 
‘nationalist-cum-developmentalist ideology for both nation building and 
development’. This pattern resonates with Nigeria as until 1985 the state was 
central to development strategies, chiefly National Development Plans that aimed 
to transform the structure of the economy.  Over this period, the Nigerian context 
was characterised in particular ways across the political, economic and social 
realms. These include: the ideological dominance of a strong role for the state 
alongside an emergent indigenous private sector; disruptions to regionally-based 
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political contestations and increasing centralisation of political power through 
pervasive military rule; post-independence expectations of industrialisation across 
Africa; change in the primary source of public revenue from agriculture to the oil 
economy and; the evolving geographic and social location of related economic 
activity, i.e. urban-based industrial activity and rural-based agriculture (Ikpe, 2014). 
 
The enhanced DSP shows: how the state resources the agricultural sector by 
managing and influencing fiscal linkages between oil and agriculture; how this 
impacts upon the capacity of the agricultural sector to address demand and food 
supply (marketed surplus) constraints on industrialisation through consumption and 
production linkages and; how underlying economic, political and social factors 
influence the state’s management of these processes (see Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1: Enhanced DSP analytical framework on the state’s deployment of 
linkages to address classical constraints on industrialisation: domestic industrial 
demand and food supply (marketed surplus)  
 
 
The enhanced DSP presents fiscal linkages within the primary sector that is 
between oil and agriculture, as having primacy over consumption and production 
linkages between primary and secondary sectors. This is because fiscal linkages 
are required for facilitating resource transfers to strengthen the primary sector as a 
base for then addressing classical demand and food/raw material supply, i.e., 
marketed surplus constraints on industrialisation. In addition, it examines critically 
the underlying economic, social and political factors that have influenced the 
functioning of the state vis-a-vis other milieus in the pursuit of structural 
transformation processes and outcomes. 
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Enabling fiscal linkages between oil and agriculture in post-independence Nigeria 
State control of the oil sector was enabled through the establishment of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation in 1977. Access to this revenue base has been 
central to the facilitation of fiscal linkages with other sectors within the economy, 
including agriculture (Ikpe, 2014). In this period, socio-economic change was 
characterised by the centrality of structural transformation and industrial policy as 
developmental objectives. This was pursued through development plans over 
1962-1985. This period remains essential to understanding the agricultural sector 
because it has defined its interaction, or lack thereof, with attempts at structural 
transformation ever since.  
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TABLE 1: Total government revenue and sources in the development planning period- Naira, millions (1962-1985) 
 
Development plans   Total government 
revenue 
Total actual 
expenditure on 
agriculture as a 
proportion of total 
expenditure (%) 
Government 
revenue from 
customs and 
excise duties as 
a proportion of 
total public 
revenue (%) 
Government 
revenue from oil 
as a proportion of 
total government 
revenue (%) 
1st development plan (1962-68) 9402 9.8 - - 
2nd development plan (1970-74) 41257.3 9.7 26 65 
3rd development plan (1975-80) 73843.8 7 15 75 
4th development plan – reviewed 
after oil price shocks (1981-85) 
 18.2 17 70 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2005 Volume 16; First, Second, Third and Fourth National Development Plans 
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Fiscal linkages between the petroleum and agricultural sectors in Nigeria 
show how the state managed and influenced transfers to the latter sector 
based on its control of public revenues from petroleum rents. This is 
evidenced from government expenditure on agriculture in relation to oil 
revenue accrued to government revenue as well as the quality of this 
expenditure. There was a steep rise in petroleum-based contributions to 
government revenue, which more than trebled from 26 per cent in 1970 to 
almost 80 per cent in the mid-1970s (CBN, 2005).  Table 1 shows that there 
is a direct relationship between total government revenue and total oil 
revenue (as a proportion of government revenue) over 1970-1985. Net 
fiscal transfers to agriculture are linked closely to the proportion of 
government revenue generated from rising petroleum resources.  
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FIGURE 2: Public spending on agriculture in the development planning 
period- Naira, millions (1962-1985) 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2005 Volume 16; First, Second, Third 
and Fourth National Development Plans 
 
From Figure 2, one can observe that actual agricultural expenditure, as a 
proportion of total expenditure, was in decline until 1980, before a major 
increase as agriculture was reprioritised after the oil price crash of the late 
1970s. Nonetheless total expenditure on agriculture rose exponentially 
alongside the substantial increase in government revenue as a result of oil 
revenue. These fiscal linkages resulted in widespread policy interventions 
and infrastructural developments via the development-planning framework.  
 
Fiscal linkages influenced by the state led to Integrated Rural Development 
Projects (IRDPs) and the Agricultural Development Programmes in the 
1970s that were established to provide feeder roads, earth dams, 
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subsidised inputs and service centres (Mustapha, 1993). There was 
substantial investment in capital infrastructure, including dams and 
irrigation systems, constituting 31 per cent of the total actual expenditure 
on agriculture over 1975-1980 (FGN, 1981). There was extensive public 
investment dominated by large-scale agricultural projects including the 
National Accelerated Food Production Programme over 1975-1980 and 
Operation Feed the Nation in 1976 (Kwanashie et al, 1998:32). 
 
Unlike the Asian context, investments were biased towards large-scale 
cultivation systems, despite the dominance of small-scale producers. For 
instance, a total of 159,517 hectares of irrigation capacity was developed 
under the River Basin Development Authorities from the 1970s (RBDAs). 
Only 35 per cent of this comprised the small-scale Fadama irrigation 
system (FAO, 2005). Programmes and institutions were set up to provide 
credit to producers namely: the Rural Banking Scheme with two initial 
phases over 1977-1985; the National Agricultural and Cooperative Bank 
(NACB), in 1973; and the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund, 
established in 1977 that secured the loans of commercial farmers (Osinubi, 
2003; Mogues et al, 2008: 49-51).  The 1978 Land Use Decree ceded land 
ownership rights to government officials (LFN, 1990). This enabled the 
allocation of land to large-scale producers of the political class at the 
expense of smaller scale producers. The performance of the IRDPs was 
criticised for their detrimental policies of resource allocation biased against 
small-scale producers (Wallace, 1980).  
 
 22 
Agricultural sector performance and capacity for consumption and 
production linkages to strengthen structural transformation 
In spite of the fiscal linkages through net transfers from the oil to the 
agricultural sector, there was limited capacity for building synergies 
between consumption linkages and industrial demand as well as production 
linkages and food supply. Even though traditional food crop production was 
largely stable over the 1970s decade, annual production of traded 
commodities contracted in a pattern that has since defined agricultural 
exports: cocoa by 43 per cent, rubber by 29 per cent and cotton by 65 per 
cent so that real agricultural export crop production contracted at an annual 
rate of about 30 per cent (Oyejide, 1986; Scherr, 1989). Furthermore, 
domestic food crop production has failed over time to keep pace with 
domestic demand leading to consistent increases in imports and declining 
national food self-sufficiency (FAO, 2013). Thus agriculture failed to 
address food supply constraints through production linkages. 
 
Williams (1965) mooted the anticipated role of agriculture as the key market 
for domestically produced industrial goods in post-independence Nigeria. 
Yet, the rural and largely agricultural economy has been unable to live up 
to this expectation. Agriculture’s share in GDP and total employment 
declined from 49 to 22 per cent of GDP and 72 to 59 per cent respectively 
over the 1970s (Scherr, 1989). There has also been an abysmal decline of 
agricultural exports as a proportion of merchandise exports from 64 per 
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cent in 1962 to 2 per cent in 1985 (World Bank, 2016).3 Due to rising rural 
wages owing to a labour exodus to the industrial sector over the 1970s 
decade, the substantial contraction of wage labour use limited the capacity 
of the sector to support potentially domestic industrial demand through 
consumption linkages (Bevan et al, 1999:30; Nwosu, 1991; Oyejide, 
1986:41; Andrae and Beckman, 1985: 4; Eicher and Baker, 1982). The 
state’s influencing of fiscal linkages in a bias towards large-scale agriculture 
at the expense of small-scale production has been a central criticism 
resulting from the poor efficiency of fiscal linkages between the oil and 
agricultural sectors. 4 
 
Economic, political and social factors and the functioning of the Nigerian 
state 
 In Nigeria underlying economic, political and social factors have influenced 
processes and outcomes. Andrae and Beckman (1985:4) find that this 
neglect of the widest cluster of rural producers accompanied the decline of 
the agricultural sector as a powerful source of political patronage organised 
through regionally-based marketing boards. State control of rising volumes 
of oil production undermined the significance of the agricultural sector as a 
base for financial power. In fact, Henley et al (2012) argue that disregard 
for the agricultural sector stemmed from the fact that it was not viewed as 
                                            
3 Agricultural trade taxes that had hitherto been a vital source of savings in its contribution to 
government revenue declined precipitously standing at 17 per cent over the early 1980s (see 
Table 1). 
4 Other factors such as the overvaluation of the Naira against the backdrop of expanding oil 
exports also played a substantial role in undermining agricultural exports given their reduced 
competitiveness (Oyejide, 1986). 
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a primary threat to political stability. In addition, investment in the sector 
was deployed also as means of facilitating private accumulation of state 
resources especially for political elites. For instance, Palmer-Jones (1987) 
and Adams (1991) have argued that investment in large-scale irrigation 
systems was driven by powerful elements of the political elite given the 
benefits they accrued from expensive construction contracts.  
 
The fledgling influence of producers is buttressed by the declining 
relevance of producer associations. The pre-independence Association of 
Nigerian Cooperative Exporters (ANCE) worked closely with state 
marketing boards from their pre-independence era until the end of their 
operation in 1985 with SAP (Dannson et al, 2004). However, in a 2009 
interview,5  the then Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Dr 
Ruma, concurred that the Nigerian state had failed to utilise producer 
associations effectively as they ‘were not properly organised or regulated’ 
and had no ‘clout to pool together for meaningful investment’. 
 
Agriculture, oil and structural change in the aftermath 
This section examines continuities with later policy periods in the 
examination of the potential (or lack thereof) for agriculture to support 
structural change across SAP and post-SAP of National Economic 
                                            
5 In 2009 the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development, Dr Ruma, was interviewed by the Nigerian 
business magazine, Economic Confidential-  Economic Confidential 2009, ‘We Are Revolutionizing the 
Agricultural Sector through Cooperatives’ 
http://www.economicconfidential.com/feb09interviewagricruma.htm (accessed January 12 2010) 
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Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) and Agricultural 
Transformation Action Plan (ATAP) policy periods.  
 
The marginalisation of agriculture as a significant element of structural 
transformation has been reinforced in the aftermath the development-
planning period. Across key discernible policy periods of the SAPs of the 
mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the NEEDS and Presidential Initiatives on crops 
including rice and cassava over the early 2000s and the more recent 2011 
ATAP centred on poverty alleviation strategies and increased market-
orientation and private sector partnerships that have seen continued fiscal 
linkages with the petroleum sector.  
 
The significance of fiscal transfers from oil to agriculture has continued 
through the substantial contribution of oil revenue to total government 
revenue and onward budgetary allocation to agriculture (see Figure 3). 
Agricultural expenditure has risen by over 8 per cent and averaged about 5 
per cent of agricultural GDP over 1980-2005 (Fan et al, 2005). Budgetary 
allocation to agriculture as a proportion of total budget spending has had 
spikes at 8 per cent and 10 per cent respectively but has averaged 3 per 
cent since the mid-1980s (see Figure 3).  
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FIGURE 3: Public spending on agriculture in relation to government 
revenue in Nigeria (1986-2015)  
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2005 Volume 16; Central Bank of 
Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2009, Volume 18; Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 
2012; Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2015; Central Bank of Nigeria Statistics 
Database 
 
This level of commitment is subpar as it is substantially below the 10 per 
cent commitment adopted in 2003 by the African Union at the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). 
Most recently the provision of 1.6 per cent of the 2016 annual budget to 
agriculture has been criticised by key public policymakers as reinforcing the 
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longstanding neglect of the sector since the end of the 1970s and 
undermining its potential wider contributions to socio-economic 
transformation.6 
 
The treatment of agriculture in the post-development planning period has 
built upon the neglect of smallholder producers that once formed the 
backbone of Nigeria’s vibrant agricultural sector in the post-independence 
period. The SAPs are cited as reinforcing the maligning of small-scale 
producers given the dismantling of government institutions with the 
responsibility for supporting the small-scale producers through extension 
services and input provision especially (Nwosu, 1991; Alaofin, 1999; 
Gibbon and Olukoshi, 1996; Mustapha, 1993). The liberalisation drive that 
ensued saw policy frameworks enabling land acquisition for large-scale 
farming served to dispossess smallholders of the use of their land (Egwu, 
1998). 
 
Under NEEDS, interventions for improving productivity levels especially for 
the smallholder constituency including research, capacity-building, 
agricultural finance and irrigation facilities were neglected (Mogues et al, 
2008; Bientema and Ayoola, 2004). This has implied that for example, input 
supply efforts have not been cognisant of the realities of small-scale 
producers to take gradualist approaches to the use of improved varieties 
                                            
6  Statement by Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development in May 2016. 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/05/12/ogbeh-1-6-of-budget-not-enough-for-
agriculture-ministry/ 
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and the lack of complementary small-scale capital provision undermined 
outcomes. In certain contexts, the overarching centrality of poverty 
alleviation vis-à-vis productive capacity appears to have weakened public 
sector considerations around productivity and agency of producers as 
economic actors.7 This outcome speaks to Mkandawire’s (2010) argument 
for policy interventions to transcend the very narrow focus on poverty that 
has attended recent development policy directives.  
 
With the ATAP there is recognition of small-scale producers as the lifeblood 
of the agricultural sector. Input provision through technology use has 
targeted small-scale producers through schemes such as the use of mobile 
telephony platforms for private sector-driven provision of seeds and 
fertilisers (FMARD, 2013). However, the more critical infrastructural 
investments have focussed on large-scale producers. In 2012, thirteen 
large-scale rice mills were set up with a commitment of 1.2 billion USD from 
the Chinese EXIM bank for an additional 100 large-scale rice mills (FMARD, 
2013).  
 
Finance provision has also focussed on large-scale enterprise with 200 
million USD secured for large-scale cassava processing and 3.7 billion N 
in loans to commercial seed providers and agro-dealers (FMARD, 2013). 
The Central Bank of Nigeria-led Nigerian Incentive-Based Risk Sharing 
                                            
7  In interviews with officials in the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in 2006, the Presidential Initiative on Rice was presented fundamentally as ‘help’ 
for smallholders, labeled ‘the poor’ with limited commensurate concern around their productive 
capacity and potential contribution to the wider economy.  
 29 
System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) focuses on developing 
participation further along value chains and sharing financial risks with 
commercial lenders (CBN, 2011). But implementation has revealed the bias 
against smallholders as participating commercial banks maintain pre-
existing lending patterns that exclude this group.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8 ‘Minister, stakeholder decry banks non-implementation of N450bn NIRSAL fund’ The Sun 
Newspaper June 11 2013 http://sunnewsonline.com/new/business/minister-stakeholder-decry-
banks-non-implementation-of-n450bn-nirsal-fund/ (accessed October 1 2013) 
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FIGURE 4: Food imports, food exports and agriculture value-added (annual 
growth) (1986-2015) 
 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2016 
The performance of the agricultural sector has been volatile since the 
1980s with especially dismal outcomes over the early 1990s and since 
2009, when it has seen continuous decline from the CAADP 6 per cent 
target (see Figure 4). This limits potential linkages with the industrial sector 
as is evidenced by the notable spikes in food imports and the lacklustre 
performance of food exports over time (see Figure 4). These highlight the 
longstanding pattern of challenges with food self-sufficiency and capacity 
to contribute towards addressing food supply constraints. 
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Rural poverty in Nigeria stood at 31.5 per cent as against urban poverty as 
10.2 per cent (World Bank, 2014a). This demonstrates the shortcomings in 
a largely rural agricultural sector’s contribution to structural transformation 
through consumption linkages. Productivity improvements within 
smallholder agriculture are an important means of improving rural incomes 
as well as addressing rural poverty in Nigeria. Yet there has been a 
consistent failure of interventions to focus on productivity improvements for 
the majority small-scale agricultural producer constituency through 
channels including access to inputs, agricultural research, credit and capital 
use (World Bank, 2014b; Phillip et al., 2009; Ogunlela and Ogungbile, 
2006).9 
 
In the end the entrenched neglect of the smallholder core has challenged 
the long-term capacity of the agricultural sector to address the noted 
constraints on industrialisation. This is in spite of evidence that has: 
highlighted the relatively higher productivity levels of small-scale vis-à-vis 
large-scale agricultural enterprise that could address production and 
consumption linkages (Oni et al, 2015) and;10 smallholders’ tendency to 
                                            
9 Capital use in labour saving technology is especially significant for enabling pluriactivity, which 
is a vital source of income from non-farm sources in these contexts. This was significant across 
developmental states Japan and Taiwan and is increasingly an important element of boosting 
incomes in rural agricultural constituencies in Nigeria (Francks et al, 1999: 61).   
10  This outcome corroborates findings in other contexts including Indonesia that have 
challenged dominant assumptions about lower productivity prone smallholder enterprise 
(Geertz, 1966, Dan-Azumi, 2011). In fact challenges with smallholder labour productivity in 
Nigeria have been attributed to factors such as regional variations as a result of competing 
demand for labour in the Niger Delta and socio-cultural affiliations with certain crops, access to 
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form stronger consumption linkages with domestically produced goods 
(Hazell et al, 2006).  
 
Conclusions 
Empirical realities in the global economy have swung the pendulum in 
favour of industrial policy after a long period out in the proverbial cold. It is 
fundamental to draw from lessons across space and time to inform the 
burgeoning discourse with a degree of specificity to affected contexts. To 
this end, intellectual reflections on developmental statehood, linkages 
across economic sectors and problematising the state-market dichotomy 
have been of immense value.  In spite of its challenges the DSP has proved 
most useful as a result of its inductive methodological basis in classical 
development economics interpretations of empirical realities. This has 
enabled the introduction of the enhanced DSP with the (re)engagement of 
key significant issues, including agriculture and mineral resources, that may 
otherwise have been neglected, because they have been relevant in the 
DSP’s own empirical underpinning.  
 
Significantly, with the enhanced DSP it has been possible to privilege 
analysis of the complex interactions between the state and other critical 
entities in socio-economic transition processes. Underhill’s (2000) 
argument is reinforced in that the structures of the state are dependent on 
political processes as well as economic and political resources of various 
                                            
agricultural research and infrastructural support such as small-scale irrigation facilities as 
opposed to farm size (Oni et al, 2015).  
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constituencies alongside processes within the market. In line with this 
thinking, economic and political logics may pull in different directions so that 
even though agricultural investment increased exponentially in the 
development-planning period in Nigeria, the political (and indeed social) 
logic determined that it was misdirected and undermined the sector’s core 
productive base, the smallholder constituency.  
 
The domestic policy context has been central to this analysis. Yet the global 
policy terrain was significant in the consolidation of intervention patterns 
that consistently weakened small-scale agricultural enterprise and its 
potential contribution to structural transformation. These are evidenced by 
the SAP’s call for reduced public expenditure that limited extension services 
and agricultural research influenced by: the intellectual rise of market-
fundamentalist analyses and attendant impact on global development 
policy; NEEDS’s dissociation of the poverty of small-scale producers from 
their productive capacity that was informed by a broader near-exclusive 
focus on the poverty eradication as development agenda and; ATAP’s 
prioritisation of infrastructural investments in large-scale enterprise to 
underscore the pre-eminence of formal private enterprise as the engine for 
inclusive growth. Fundamentally these also evidence the systematic 
delinking of agricultural interventions from industrial policy in spite of 
extensive evidence of the volatility of mineral resources as an alternative 
base for structural transformation.  
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Revisiting the Asian experience is salient for South-South learning, given 
the current opening up of debate on industrial transformation in Africa from 
the orthodoxy to the heterodoxy. Against the background of wider 
developmental state experiences and classical development economic 
theories, it has enabled a level of conceptualisation around the complexity 
of state engagement with dualised primary sectors towards structural 
transformation.  
 
The historical reflection on the Nigeria case has been essential to offer 
nuanced reading of state action in developmental pursuits in the much-
maligned 1970s decade. Instead of the generalised blanket dismissals that 
dominate analyses of that period this paper offers insights into the intricate 
dynamics that underscored outcomes and the continuities therein with 
current development performance. Such a careful re-examination offers an 
informed basis for the emerging ubiquity of reflections on industrialisation 
in Africa.  
 
A final point of note is that recalibrating the state-market logic has shown 
the important connection between the agency and political capital of the 
agricultural constituency and policy interventions to enable economic 
contributions from agriculture to socio-economic transformation.  As such 
neglecting the complex interlinkages between economic, political and 
indeed social spheres, across the public and private sectors, undermines 
the comprehension of the process and outcome of interventions. 
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